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In 1990 ballot Measure 5 passed, which limited the property tax rate that counties could levy to 
$15 per $1000 assessed value in Oregon. In 1997 voters approved Measure 50, after first 
approving the similar Measure 47 in 1996, which prevents the assessed value of all individual 
properties from increasing more than 3% per year beginning with the 1995-96 tax year.  Both 
measures are embedded in the state constitution.  As shown in a previous Northwest Economic 
Research Center (NERC) study1, one consequence of these tax limitations is inequitable tax 
burdens.  Following up on this finding, Common Ground requested that the Northwest 
Economic Research Center undertake a simulation of an alternative tax structure to determine 
if a Land Value Tax  (LVT) would lead to increased equity and incentives to utilize land more 
wisely in concert with Oregon’s statewide growth management program enacted in 1973.   
 
The analytical approach adopted for this study develops in two steps. First, an exemption from 
M-5 and M-50 limitations.  This would allow assessments to revert to real market value (RMV) 
instead of the limited-growth maximum assessed value (MAV).  It would also allow the tax rate 
on land assessments to reach the higher levels required under LVT. Since RMV assessments are 
by now considerably higher than MAV assessments, the applied tax rates are proportionally 
reduced so that the simulated tax outcome is revenue neutral.  First stage simulation results 
will compare taxes on selected properties under two scenarios – MAV and RMV under the 
equal rate tax.  
 
The second step is to simulate a change from the present equal rate tax to a split rate tax – a 
higher rate on land assessments and lower rate on improvements. Variations in simulated tax 
levies in all three trials occur at the parcel level.  These are first aggregated by land use class 
and later by level of land utilization. Much of this NERC study is limited to examining the effects 
of LVT on two illustrative communities: Inner Northeast (INE) and Outer Southeast (OSE). Both 
of which have a mix of vacant, commercial, industrial, and single-family property types. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a major motivator for investigating alternative property tax structures is 
the regressivity of the current system. The following graph displays the equitability issue of the 
current tax system across several measurements (see Figure E.S.1). First, the horizontal axis for 
each is the estimated median household income for the property.2 The vertical axis is a 
measurement of tax payment—the current effective mill rate (tax per $1,000 of RMV). Next, 
the two areas of analysis are differentiated by color with Outer-Southeast in red, and Inner-
Northeast in blue. Lastly, the size of the data points indicates the number of households at the 
specific income level. 
                                                          
1 “Oregon Property Tax Capitalization: Evidence from Portland”. Available at www.pdx.edu/nerc/projects 
2American Community Survey Data by Census tract. Available at: www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/data.html 
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Figure E.S.1: Effective RMV Mill Rate by Income and Community 
 
There are clear differences in many of the measurements within Figure E.S.1. While estimated 
median incomes in Outer-Southeast are clustered around $40,000, there is far more spread in 
incomes in Inner-Northeast, ranging from $60,000 to $100,000. However, the amount of RMV 
that is taxable is generally higher in Outer-Southeast, the lower income area.  This indicates 
consistent growth in RMV in excess of the 3% limit imposed by Measure 50 for the Inner-
Northeast community, and results in inequitable tax payments. 
Figure E.S.2 below displays the effective mill rates resulting from the 90/10 LVT. The separate 
rates on land and improvement value results in a significantly more balanced rate distribution 
than in Figure E.S.1 above. Furthermore, a LVT system would be slightly income progressive (as 
opposed to the marked regressivity shown in Figure 1).  
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LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: Simulating the Effects in Multnomah County  3 
 
    
   
 Northwest Economic  
 Research Center   
 
 
This is only one result of the analysis. Other sections of this report highlight how an LVT 
implemented in Multnomah County would incentivize development, shift taxes based on land-
use class, and encourage land improvements. There is also a discussion of potential regressive 
outcomes, and how to mitigate them with carefully crafted legislation or other tax structures 
(such as the AXI building exemption tax discussed on pages 28-31). 
Ultimately, land-based property tax systems, whether a split-rate LVT or an AXI building 
exemption tax, do what they are designed to do—place more of the tax burden on wealthier 
landowners, and encourage the highest and best use of land. Based on the simulations 
performed on the INE and OSE communities, a LVT would provide a more equitable tax 
structure, incentivize upgrading and developing properties, and discourage “holding” land for 
speculative purposes. Furthermore, the potential downsides of the tax policy—such as 
increasing taxes on low-income homeowners—can be mitigated with carefully crafted 
legislation. In short, many of the inequities created by Measure 5 and 50 would likely be 















LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: Simulating the Effects in Multnomah County  4 
 
    
   
 Northwest Economic  




In 1990 ballot Measure 5 passed, which limited the property tax rate that counties could levy to 
$15 per $1000 assessed value in Oregon. In 1997 voters approved Measure 50, after first 
approving the similar Measure 47 in 1996, which prevents the assessed value of all individual 
properties from increasing more than 3% per year beginning with the 1995-96 tax year.  Both 
measures are embedded in the state constitution.  As shown in a previous Northwest Economic 
Research Center (NERC) study3, one consequence of these tax limitations is inequitable tax 
burdens.  Following up on this finding, Common Ground requested that the Northwest 
Economic Research Center undertake a simulation of an alternative tax structure to determine 
if a Land Value Tax  (LVT) would lead to increased equity and incentives to utilize land more 
intensely in concert with Oregon’s statewide growth management program enacted in 1973.   
 
The analytical approach adopted for this study develops in two steps. First, an exemption from 
M-5 and M-50 limitations.  This would allow assessments to revert to real market value (RMV) 
instead of the limited-growth maximum assessed value (MAV).  It would also allow the tax rate 
on land assessments to reach the higher levels required under LVT. Since RMV assessments are 
by now considerably higher than MAV assessments, the applied tax rates are proportionally 
reduced so that the simulated tax outcome is revenue neutral at the county level.  First stage 
simulation results will compare taxes on selected properties under two scenarios – MAV and 
RMV under the equal rate tax.  
 
The second step is to simulate a change from the present equal rate tax to a split rate tax – a 
higher rate on land assessments and lower rate on improvements.  The split rate is expressed as 
an LVT Ratio, the percentage of the tax rate applied to the land assessment of all taxable 
parcels. Split rates are determined on a revenue-neutral basis at the county level, and 
assessments are RMV.  Thus, total county revenue will be the same for (i) the conventional 
equal rate tax with MAV assessments, (ii) an equal rate RMV tax (step 1), and the split rate land 
value tax (step 2).  Variations in simulated tax levies in all three trials occur at the parcel level.  
These are first aggregated by land use class and later by level of land utilization.  
 
This study consists of model simulations of tax shift progressing from the present conventional 
tax to real market value assessments and land value taxation in two contrasting Portland 
communities. 
 
This analysis aims to respond to the following questions: 
 Do owners possessing similar property attributes receive more equitable tax treatment 
under RMV assessments; under LVT?   
                                                          
3 “Oregon Property Tax Capitalization: Evidence from Portland”. Available at www.pdx.edu/nerc/projects 
LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: Simulating the Effects in Multnomah County  5 
 
    
   
 Northwest Economic  
 Research Center   
 
 
 How do the assessments and tax burdens of 
residents in gentrifying regions differ from what 
they are now?   
 Do the tax incentives accompanying LVT 
encourage upgrading and discourage land 
speculation?   
 Are certain classes of land users overburdened?   
 Does tax shift accompanying LVT help mitigate 
expected increases in some property assessments 
due to the change from MAV to RMV? 
 What tax relief measures might be appropriate in 
hardship cases:  An alternative land-based tax? A 
property tax deferral? 
 
Background 
The conception of land value taxation is attributed to 19th 
century political economist Henry George’s work on the 
extraction of land rent. Georgist theory of land taxation 
holds that a property tax based upon site values provides 
an incentive to bring land into productive use; 
simultaneously, a reduction or abolition of taxes on site 
improvements should encourage more efficient land use. 
Land value taxation (LVT) taxes the highest use value of 
land4, in contrast to conventional property taxes 
structures which include the value of buildings or other 
improvements when assessing value. LVT is intended to 
counter the monopolization of land and incentivize 
landowners to use their land more productively.  
Oregon Property Tax Laws 
Oregon’s convoluted property tax rules motivate the 
current conversation about LVT. The passage of 
Measures 5 and 50 drastically changed the way property 
taxes were assessed in Oregon. The cumulative effects of 
                                                          
4 The reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property that is physically possible, 
appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value. The four criteria the highest and 
best use must meet are legal permissibility, physical possibility, financial feasibility, and maximum productivity. 
(Definition from the Appraisal Institute: The Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th Edition, p. 333) 
Calculating Property Taxes 
under the Current System 
 
Calculating the actual tax due for a 
household can be complicated due to the 
multiple rates and valuation methods.  
The calculation begins with the 
comparison of two values, based on a 
property’s MAV and RMV.  Based on its 
location in various taxing districts, each 
property will have a number of 
government tax rates and a number of 
education tax rates.  The sum of these 
rates is then multiplied by the MAV to 
calculate the base tax.  If the calculated 
base tax exceeds the Measure 5 cap of 
1.5% of current RMV, any temporary 
voter approved property tax measure for 
specific services (such as increased 
funding for public safety, libraries or 
schools) is reduced first, all the way to $0 
if necessary. If the taxes still exceed 
Measure 5 caps, each permanent tax rate 
component within the base tax is then 
compressed proportionally such that the 
base tax will equal the Measure 5 cap.    
In order to calculate final taxes, the 
bonded general government and bonded 
education rates, which fund capital 
construction projects, such as new 
buildings or equipment, are multiplied by 
the MAV and added to the base tax.  
These bonded rates are not subject to the 
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limiting the growth of property assessments under Ballot Measure 50 are continuous revenue 
shortfalls, an increasing disparity between true market values and taxable assessments and 
unequal tax treatment of taxpayers with similarly valued property. A 2018 Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities report identifies Oregon as one of four states where property tax 
structures exacerbate economic inequities, and a 2017 Oregonian article concludes that 
Oregon’s property tax system has dramatically distorted the tax burden in the Portland area.  
City Club of Portland’s 2013 report critiques the current system, suggesting that it is 
inequitable, undermines local control, and difficult to comprehend.5 A 2014 report by East 
Portland Action Plan (EPAP) Housing Subcommittee came to similar conclusions, recommending 
a “Reset of assessed property value on sale” to deal with the inequities created by the current 
property tax system.6 
In 2014 the Northwest Economic Research Center (NERC) published a study on the effects of 
Measures 5 and 50 on property tax capitalization in Portland. In that study, NERC specifically 
sought to understand – if two houses are similar in all ways except for their property tax 
payments, do their sale prices differ as a result? The study concluded that tax payments are 
having a significant effect on sale prices. Assuming a discount rate of 3% and a perpetual 
lifespan of properties, we expect a property that would last into perpetuity to show 
capitalization of $33.33 for every dollar decrease in property taxes. Depending on the 
estimation specification, we found that the capitalization of property taxes into property value 
in the Portland area ranges from 15% to 92%.7 
Effects of Measures 5 and 50 
The two measures created two separate limits that come into play depending on the MAV and 
RMV of a property. 
 Measure 5 Limit: Maximum Allowable Tax  
=$15 per thousand dollars of RMV 
 Measure 50 Limit: Maximum Annual Growth in MAV=3% 
If the levy according to the property’s Levy Code Area (LCA) is greater than the maximum 
allowable tax, compression occurs, reducing the amount of tax each jurisdiction can collect.  
                                                          
5 City Club of Portland. (2013). “Reconstructing Oregon’s Frankentax: Improving the Equity, Financial Sustainability, 
and Effeciency of Property Taxes”. Retrieved from: http://members.pdxcityclub.com/library/reportarchive 
6 East Portland Action Plan, Housing Subcommittee. (2013). “Property Tax Inequity Analysis”. Retrieved from: 
http://eastportlandactionplan.org/sites/default/files 
7 “Oregon Property Tax Capitalization: Evidence from Portland”. Available at www.pdx.edu/nerc/projects 
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According to Linhares & Provost, the Oregon property tax system is functioning in line with 
what voters approved more than two decades ago.8 They explain that the bulk of responsibility 
to fund public education has been shifted to the state and property tax bills have been made 
more predictable; however, these outcomes are tilted in favor of the property owner, and in 
some cases restrict revenue streams necessary for state and local governments to provide 
adequate services. Portland based organizations like City Club of Portland and East Portland 
Action Plan identified several issues with the Oregon system as it is currently functioning:  
 The system contains and is exacerbating inequities  
 It appears to be undermining local control  
 It is failing to maintain voter approved service levels   
 The system is extremely complex which undermines constituent confidence  
Additionally, property tax imposed in Oregon as a whole has been growing at a decreasing rate 
since 2010, while inflation has been growing at a consistently higher rate. This relationship can 
be observed in Multnomah County where total property tax imposed grew by a little less than 
1.4 percent between 2011 and 2012 while inflation grew by 2.3 percent.9 
Among the above-mentioned issues, perhaps one of the most prominent is that the Oregon 
system has effectively disconnected the amount paid in property taxes from the value of the 
property. This results in horizontal inequity, the case in which property owners with similarly 
valued properties and levels of service pay dramatically different property tax rates. NERC’s 
2014 report concludes that this disconnect creates a distortion in the market for houses and 
condos, and from a policy perspective, arbitrarily benefits some property owners and harms 
others. In reference to these critiques, alternatives to the current system have been proposed. 
One proposition is a shift to a system that relies primarily on Land Value Taxation.  
Literature on LVT 
In conventional property tax systems, the property tax rate applies to both the value of land 
and improvements made upon it. Building on a parcel of land or making major structural 
improvements will increase the assessed value, thereby increasing the property tax bill. This 
equal rate property tax, in theory, disincentivizes capital investments in real estate, as it 
increases the cost. By way of contrast, LVT relies on the realistic assumption that land is a fixed 
commodity and designates property taxes based on the “highest and best use” (HBU) value of 
the land. Landowners are incentivized to pursue the most efficient land investment under LVT.  
LVT theory also disincentivizes speculative land purchases and the “holding” of land out of 
production with the intention of reselling it at a higher price. A high tax on the HBU value of 
                                                          
8 Linhares, T., & Provost, E. (2011). Recent History of Oregon’s Property Tax System. Available at: 
www.tsccmultco.com/graphics/Recent_History_jan_2012.pdf 
9 Oregon Department of Revenue. (2013). Oregon Property Tax Statistics from fiscal year 1997-98 to present. 
Available at: www.oregon.gov/dor/STATS/Pages/statistics.aspx#property 
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land increases holding costs to a level which is less financially viable. Buyers would avoid 
purchasing land they did not intend to improve upon.  
Another key component of LVT theory is land conservation. It shifts tax burden onto the 
extensive use of finite goods society wishes to conserve. As described by Durning and Bauman 
in “Tax Shift,” LVT is a tax that moves taxes away from things we want more of – that is 
productive uses, and toward a limited resource – land, the consumption we want less of.10  
While LVT is income progressive in the aggregate, there are situations where lower income 
owners face increased costs. There are methods of mitigating these negative effects and are 
discussed in the “Mitigation” section below.  
Proponents of LVT argue that changes in land value is created by the community while capital 
investments come from landowners.11 Thus, communities should benefit from the value they 
created as landowners benefit from their investments. A “pure” form of LVT would capture the 
full annual land value, applying the entire tax rate to land assessments, while split rates capture 
a portion of the annual land value, applying a partial tax rate to land and a partial rate to 
improvements.   
Several economists have produced research seeking to understand the potential outcomes of 
implementing LVT systems. Due to the lack of adoption of LVT in the U.S., nearly all of these 
studies rely on simulation methods to draw conclusions. Key concerns when analyzing the 
viability of a switch to LVT include generating sufficient revenue, increasing overall welfare 
through capital improvements, and understanding how the tax burden shifts. Most literature 
on LVT suggests it would result in a more income progressive distribution of tax burden, lower 
housing costs, and increased capital investment but are uncertain about the financial 
feasibility.12 In Oregon, the current property tax structure creates assessed values lower than 
real market values, leading to relatively lower tax revenues than the property values suggest. 
Thus, generating sufficient revenue under LVT should not be difficult in Oregon. While not the 
central focus of most empirical studies, many acknowledge that LVT can create undue burden 
for certain types of households without carefully crafted legislation. 
Specifically, people who are “land rich and income poor” pose a problem when considering a 
switch to LVT. One of the key motivators for LVT is to create a situation where those with low 
incomes bear lower incidence. However, in urban areas where land value has grown 
significantly in a relatively short amount of time there are undoubtedly people who live in 
homes near urban centers that earn relatively low incomes. For these homeowners, LVT would 
                                                          
10 Durning, A. T.; Bauman, Y. (1998). “Tax Shift”. Northwest Environment Watch. Seattle, Washington.  
11 Dye, R., & England, W. (2010) Assessing the Theory and Practice of Land Value Taxation. Available at: 
www.lincolninst.edu 
12 Song, Y., & Zenou, Y. (2006). Property tax and urban sprawl: Theory and implications for US cities. Available at:    
Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 60, Issue 3                                                                                                                                                                                   
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likely increase their tax incidence. However, measures such as delaying a switch to LVT until 
death or sale and implementing a lower LVT/RMV ratio for overburdened landowners are policy 
measures that could correct for these situations and are discussed in the “Mitigation” section 
below. 
LVT in the United States 
Some regions in the United States have adopted LVT, including counties in Pennsylvania, 
Hawaii, Connecticut and Alabama. The duration and outcomes vary by situation. Some 
successfully implemented LVT for decades while others lasted only for a few years. For 
example, in Pennsylvania, where LVT was most widely adopted, some counties and cities are 
still using it, while others have repealed it.13 The city of Pittsburgh instituted a split-rate LVT in 
1913 and used it for nearly a century before reverting to a traditional property tax in 2001. In 
this instance, research suggests LVT was repealed due to poor assessment and rate setting 
practices despite evidence LVT encouraged building activity.14 In the Hawaii case, LVT taxation 
was abandoned because it was seen as a cause of the overdevelopment of Waikiki in the 
1970’s. 
 
Smaller municipalities such as Harrisburg City, Scranton City, and DuBois City still use LVT today.  
Subsequent studies by the Center for the Study of Economics in Philadelphia have shown 
consistently higher building permit rates in the LVT cities.15 They have also cited several cities in 
Pennsylvania showing that LVT also simplifies the assessment process. Under LVT, use of 
computer aided mass appraisal (CAMA) enables cost-effective land assessment. Since LVT 
deemphasizes the importance of improvement assessments, several Pennsylvania cities have 
experienced fewer property tax appeals and have reduced assessor staff accordingly. While 
simplifying assessment, LVT improves data collection and rate application. 
 
While some variations and experimentation with land taxation are presently taking place in 
Vermont and Connecticut, no other states in the U.S. have recently implemented LVT, leaving 
no clear model for Oregon.   
Methodology 
This section covers the techniques required to calculate the levy mill rates for the purpose of 
simulating property tax system changes, including RMV and LVT. Resulting levy mill rates will 
ensure revenue neutrality, collecting the same level of revenue for the county as the current 
conventional system. We use property tax data from the 2017-18 tax year, courtesy of the 
Multnomah County Assessor's Office, comprised of 276,558 tax lots. 
                                                          
13 Bourassa, S. (1990). Land value taxation and housing development: Effects of the property tax reform in three 
types of cities. Available at: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 49 Issue 1 
14 Oates, W. E.; Schwab, R. M.. (1997). National Tax Journal. Available at www.ntanet.org 
15 Center for the Study of Economics. (2009). Land Value Taxation in Philadelphia. Available at www.urbantools.org 
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Most of the current inequity of Oregon’s property tax structure is driven by increasing 
disparities in property values due to Measure 50 which limits the growth of MAV to the 
minimum of RMV or 103% of the past year's MAV. For properties growing in value at 3% per 
year, the taxable value of the property also grows at 3%, resulting in balanced levy payments. 
However, the taxable share of value for properties experiencing high value growth falls, and 
properties experiencing little growth may see their taxable share increase.   
Over time, this creates a gap in the effective mill rates—the rate paid per thousand dollars of 
RMV—for properties even within the same Levy Code Area (LCA). Figure 1 shows the spread of 
MAV to RMV ratios across Multnomah County (i.e. what proportion of the property value is 
taxed). The county-wide MAV to RMV ratio is 39.1%. Most properties pay tax on between 30 
and 70% of the value of their property. High rates of growth in property values results in a 
lower ratio, thus a lower effective mill rate, while growth below 3% leads to a higher ratio and 
effective mill rate. This results in disparities in effective mill rates between high and low value 
growth areas, resulting in the regressivity seen under the current tax system. 
Figure 1: Distribution of MAV to RMV Ratios for All Properties in Multnomah County 
 
Additionally, Measure 5 limits mill rates by property to $15 per thousand ($10 for general 
government and $5 for education) of the property's RMV. For example, properties where $25 
per thousand of MAV16 exceeds $15 per thousand of the RMV, the mill rate is compressed. This 
compression largely occurs for properties with high MAV to RMV ratios in Levy Code Areas with 
a mill rate above $15. Local Option Levy rates are compressed first, followed by special district, 
city, and county taxes. To remove the compression caused by Measure 5, we return all tax rates 
to their LCA rate, and to remove the Measure 50 limits, we simply swap their MAV for RMV in 
the levy amount calculations. 
In Multnomah County there are 124 Levy Code Areas that incorporate City, school district, and 
fire district fees. LCA mill rates vary between $9.22 and $20.74 per thousand MAV.  Because 
                                                          
16 A common Levy Code Area tax rate. 





MAV to RMV Ratio for All Properties
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aggregated RMV assessments are considerably higher than the total MAV, the rates will have to 
be lowered to a set of LCA rates that yield the equivalent total county revenue. 
In our calculations the total tax revenue equals the MAV for each property multiplied by that 
property’s LCA tax rate. To allow for revenue neutrality after a shift away from Measure 5 and 
50 limitations, we scale each rate by a fixed proportion. With this scale, every property’s tax 
rate is reduced by a fixed proportion, which within our analysis comes to a 57.5% reduction in 
nominal tax rates. This is represented using r as the rate of tax reduction as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
 
The reduction in tax rates, as well as the shifts away from Measures 5 and 50, represents a 
stepping point from which to compare the current tax system and an LVT system to a situation 
where the effective mill rate paid by each property is equal within LCAs.  
LVT Ratio 
Setting up an LVT requires calculating separate revenue-neutral mill rates for the two 
components of RMV, and further complicates the above calculation. Since each property’s RMV 
is composed of land value (LV) and improvement value (IV), we first separate the summation: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × (𝐿𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 + 𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝)
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
 
= 𝑟𝐿 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝐿𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
+ 𝑟𝐼 ∑ 𝐿𝐶𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝐼𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝
 
By definition, the LCA rate of each property value component is equal regardless of the 
separate rates for LV and IV. These are the current revenue generated from each property 
component: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑟𝐿 × 𝐿𝑉 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑟𝐼 × 𝐼𝑉 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 
From this point, we pick the rate multipliers that meet our desired rate outcome. The two 
separate rate reduction terms above translate into the LVT ratio. This ratio determines how 
differently we want to tax LV and IV. For any tax system which taxes LV and IV at the same rate, 
there is $.50 in LV tax rate for every $.50 in IV tax rate; a 50/50 LVT ratio. If we increase the tax 
rate on land, we get a higher LVT ratio. For example, a 90/10 LVT ratio represents $.90 in LV tax 
rate for every $.10 in IV tax rate. The two LVT ratios used in this analysis are 90/10 and 60/40.  
Using this methodology, NERC seeks to understand how a switch to LVT would affect revenue 
generation, economic development, and property tax incidence in the Portland Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA).  
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Areas of Analysis 
Much of this NERC study is limited to examining the effects of LVT on two illustrative 
communities (see Figure 2). Inner Northeast (INE) and Outer Southeast (OSE) both have a mix 
of vacant, commercial, industrial, and single-family property types. However, they offer a 
compelling contrast.   
Inner Northeast is a residential and commercial district incorporating the Concordia, King and 
Vernon neighborhoods in the Northeast quadrant of Portland. The larger community centers on 
Alberta Street, and stretches approximately 2 miles, from Interstate 5 to NE 33rd Avenue, 
bounded on the north by NE Ainsworth St. and NE Fremont St. on the south. 
The Outer Southeast study area is comprised of Centennial, Powellhurst-Gilbert and Glenfair 
neighborhoods.  This community was outside the city limits until 1983 when Portland began its 
annexation program. Single family lot sizes are very large, averaging over 9,000 sq. ft. compared 
to 5,000 sq. ft. and trending smaller in INE.  One explanation for this is the sanitary sewerage 
system at the time (septic tanks). This large lot phenomenon will have implications for tax 
burden when examining the effects of LVT. 
Figure 2: Map of Two Areas of Analysis: Inner Northeast (INE) and Outer Southeast (OSE) 
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As described above, Oregon’s current property tax system results in certain land user classes 
paying higher effective tax rates. In both the INE and OSE, single family homeowners pay the 
highest effective tax rate per RMV, while commercial properties pay the lowest effective RMV 
in Inner-Northeast and rural properties pay the least in OSE.  
Currently, landowners are assessed a tax rate based on an even combination of land value and 
improvement value. Under the LVT ratio scenario used for analysis, land users would pay 
property taxes based $.90 in land rate for every $.10 in improvement rate. The impact of the 
split rates largely depends on the land share of property value. For Multnomah County, the 
average land share of total value ratio is 39.5%. Thus, any property with a higher proportion of 
their value in land will pay a higher effective tax rate under LVT. Table 1 provides a snapshot of 
the percent of land RMV to total RMV for various land user classes in Multnomah County 
(otherwise known as the Land-to-Total Value or LTV).  
Table 1: Land Share of Total Value (LTV) for Different Land Use Classes 





Single Family 45.6% 
Restaurant 52.4% 
Vacant 98.0% 
Grand Total 39.5% 
 
Two problems arose with regard to land use classes on separate ends of the MAV to RMV ratio 
spectrum. Condominiums largely have zero land value associated with their property values 
and under an LVT would receive a substantial reduction in tax rate. Conversely, farm properties 
derive the majority of their value from land and, though few in Portland, would receive a 
similarly disproportionate increase in tax rate if assessed at market value. To mitigate any 
impact of these large tax changes, we remove their property values from rate calculations and 
assume these groups would be given special consideration under a LVT law. The following chart 
shows the county-wide data used to calculate RMV tax rates and LVT split rates. It should be 
noted that the county-wide MAV and effective RMV tax rates are $22.75 and $10.00 
respectively. 
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Figure 3: Illustration of Tax Shift Rate Calculation Maintaining Constant Revenue 
 
Comparing MAV/RMV Ratios  
As mentioned earlier, a major motivator for investigating alternative property tax structures is 
the regressivity of the current system. The following graph displays the equitability issue of the 
current tax system across several measurements (see Figure 4). First, the horizontal axis for 
each is the estimated median household income for the property.17 The vertical axis is a 
measurement of tax payment—the current effective mill rate. Next, the two areas of analysis 
are differentiated by color with Outer-Southeast in red, and Inner-Northeast in blue. Lastly, 
the size of the data points indicates the number of households at the specific income level. 
Figure 4: Effective RMV Mill Rate by Income and Community 
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Median Household Income by Census Tract
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There are clear differences in many of the measurements within Figure 4. While estimated 
median incomes in Outer-Southeast are clustered around $40,000, there is far more spread in 
incomes in Inner-Northeast, ranging from $60,000 to $100,000. However, the amount of RMV 
that is taxable is generally higher in Outer-Southeast, the lower income area.  This indicates 
consistent growth in RMV in excess of the 3% limit imposed by Measure 50 for the Inner-
Northeast community, and results in inequitable tax payments. 
Implementing LVT 
As mentioned in the Methodology section, the analysis progresses through two stages. 
Measure 5 and Measure 50 limitations are exempted in the first stage, expressing values and 
rates in terms of RMV. The second stage changes the RMV uniform rate scheme to a two-rate 
90%/10% split rate land value tax regime.  Positive or negative shift in tax burden on any given 
parcel is determined by i) its land-to-total value (LTV) ratio (expressing the land value as a 
fraction of the total assessed value), and ii) MAV/RMV ratio (showing how far its MAV lags 
behind its RMV). As total tax revenue remains unchanged at the county level, a given parcel will 
generally pay a higher levy if its MAV/RMV ratio is lower than the county’s average ratio. 
Likewise, a property with a LTV ratio higher than the county’s average ratio will see a higher 
levy. In terms of the incentive effects of LVT, parcels having low LTV ratio are seen to have a 
higher utilization status.  Thus, LVT is shifting tax burden from more efficiently used sites to less 
efficiently utilized sites. 
The reporting method we use here is to provide summary results by aggregating individual 
parcels into land use categories. Simulated tax applications are performed on the entire array 
of parcels in each community. Table 2 below summarizes these two ratios for each type of land 
use in each community. As shown later in Table 3, first stage results are affected only by 
MAV/RMV ratios. Parcels with low ratios will see positive tax shift.  In the second stage, 
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Table 2: Decomposition of Land Market Values for Various Land Use Types 
Land Use Description # Parcels MAV – RMV Ratio  LTV Ratio 
INNER NORTHEAST       
Single Family 8,371 0.30 0.46 
Multi-family 2-4 units 575 0.24 0.43 
Multi-family 4 units or more 87 0.31 0.16 
Commercial 237 0.21 0.27 
Commercial - Auto Related 12 0.18 0.54 
Office 31 0.24 0.27 
Restaurant 34 0.23 0.36 
Warehouse 32 0.24 0.58 
Vacant 242 0.17 0.99 
Total 9,621 0.29 0.43 
OUTER SOUTHEAST       
Single Family 13,351 0.58 0.49 
Multi-family 2-4 units 485 0.64 0.44 
Multi-family 4 units or more 268 0.45 0.23 
Commercial 229 0.48 0.38 
Commercial - Auto Related 41 0.49 0.51 
Office 28 0.52 0.39 
Restaurant 57 0.38 0.55 
Warehouse 35 0.62 0.33 
Mobile Home 48 0.50 0.60 
Vacant 517 0.37 0.99 
Total 15,059 0.55 0.45 
 
The tax shifts in each stage and combined effects are shown in three panels of Table 3. Panel A 
compares the two tax regimes, showing the difference when moving from MAV assessments 
and current rates to RMV assessments and derived rates.  Differences are clear when 
comparing Inner Northeast and Outer Southeast communities. Almost all land uses in INE will 
see higher taxes since their MAV assessments on most land use categories account for less than 
32% of market values, compared to the county average of 39.1%. Most properties in OSE will 
see some reduction in their tax bills due to their MAVs being closer to their RMVs. 
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Table 3 Changes in Tax Incidences under Three Tax Schemes with Revenue Neutrality18 
Panel A: Current Property Tax - RMV Equal Rate Tax 
 
Land Use Description 
# 
Parcels 
Current Tax RMV Equal Rate Tax Difference Percent Change 
INNER NORTHEAST           
Single Family 8,371 32,058,762 45,858,723 13,799,961 43.0% 
Multi-family 2-4 units 575 2,074,539 3,727,544 1,653,006 79.7% 
Multi-family 4 units or more 87 3,413,178 5,314,564 1,901,386 55.7% 
Commercial 237 1,664,848 3,332,170 1,667,322 100.1% 
Commercial - Auto Related 12 37,118 86,572 49,454 133.2% 
Office 31 512,896 913,953 401,057 78.2% 
Restaurant 34 130,789 240,192 109,403 83.6% 
Warehouse 32 179,981 321,414 141,432 78.6% 
Vacant 242 320,084 824,904 504,820 157.7% 
OUTER SOUTHEAST           
Single Family 13,351 45,093,484 32,993,047 -12,100,437 -26.8% 
Multi-family 2-4 units 485 2,379,326 1,623,886 -755,439 -31.8% 
Multi-family 4 units or more 268 5,952,768 5,587,685 -365,082 -6.1% 
Commercial 229 3,834,965 3,483,443 -351,522 -9.2% 
Commercial - Auto Related 41 275,289 241,834 -33,455 -12.2% 
Office 28 286,222 244,346 -41,876 -14.6% 
Restaurant 57 394,791 439,268 44,477 11.3% 
Warehouse 35 757,817 550,953 -206,863 -27.3% 
Mobile Home 48 709,946 618,483 -91,463 -12.9% 
Vacant 517 493,592 568,513 74,921 15.2% 
 
Panel B illustrates the results of simulated tax applications in the second stage, using RMV 
assessment and derived split rates for reporting LVT results. When moving from an equal rate 
tax on RMV assessments, tax shift shows more variation.  This again is due to the differences in 
LTV ratios across land use categories (see Table 2).  Parcels indicated by high improvement 
values relative to land values experience declines in their tax bills. For example, improvement 
values being roughly 2.5 as much as land value, multi-family developments of more than 4 units 
will see significant reductions in tax bills in both INE and OSE communities.  This is consistent 
with previous LVT research findings in Washington State and Marion County where the 
multifamily category typically experienced the greatest negative tax shift among major land 
uses.19,20  Of course, a larger number of dwelling units on a unit of land is a more efficient use of 
land, hence is rewarded under a LVT tax system. 
                                                          
18 Tax-exempt properties and condos are dropped from this analysis 
19 McIntire, J.; Gihring, T. (1999). Equity, Land Use, and Resource Land Impacts of Land Value Taxation in     
Washington State. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.  
20 Gihring, T.; Nelson, K. (1999). Tax Shift—Sequential to a Land-Based Property Tax System in Salem, Oregon. 
Available upon request.  
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On the other hand, single family and smaller multi-family developments are slightly higher than 
the total county-wide LTV ratio, hence are in the aggregate subject to a moderate positive tax 
shift. Commercial uses are more likely to be nested within pedestrian-oriented commercial 
“ribbons” in INE than commercial uses in OSE which are likely scattered along commercial strips 
and in strip malls. Hence the difference in tax shift. Likewise, restaurants are likely found having 
similar characteristics.  Land utilization explains this difference in LVT taxation incentive effects. 
As expected, vacant lands will be subject to the highest increase in tax burden, as total real 
market value consists almost entirely of land. These distinctions will become more apparent 
when comparing fully developed parcels and underutilized lands in next section. 
Panel B: RMV Equal Rate Tax - Two-Rate (90-10) LVT 
Land Use Description # 
Parcels 







INNER NORTHEAST           
Single Family 8,371 45,858,723 51,793,420 5,934,697 18.5% 
Multi-family 2-4 units 575 3,727,544 3,982,596 255,052 12.3% 
Multi-family 4+ units 87 5,314,564 2,882,852 -2,431,711 -71.2% 
Commercial 237 3,332,170 2,524,413 -807,757 -48.5% 
Office 31 913,953 689,357 -224,596 -43.8% 
Restaurant 34 240,192 225,250 -14,942 -11.4% 
Warehouse 32 321,414 434,465 113,052 62.8% 
Vacant 242 824,904 1,777,153 952,248 297.5% 
OUTER SOUTHEAST           
Single Family 13,351 32,993,047 39,163,694 6,170,647 13.7% 
Multi-family 2-4 units 485 1,623,886 1,755,955 132,069 5.6% 
Multi-family 4+ units 268 5,587,685 3,808,438 -1,779,247 -29.9% 
Commercial 229 3,483,443 3,414,869 -68,574 -1.8% 
Commercial - Auto  41 241,834 300,947 59,113 21.5% 
Office 28 244,346 237,657 -6,689 -2.3% 
Restaurant 57 439,268 573,001 133,733 33.9% 
Warehouse 35 550,953 487,146 -63,807 -8.4% 
Mobile Home 48 618,483 868,511 250,028 35.2% 
Vacant 517 568,513 1,225,105 656,592 133.0% 
Other 40 103,054 60,481 -42,573 -30.2% 
 
Reforming the property tax system as proposed in these model simulations will not take the 
form of stages as shown in this analysis.  Stage 1 and 2 are for the purpose of showing the 
separate effects of each change in the tax structure.  In practice, an alternative tax being a local 
option LVT will likely take place as a complete conversion.  Panel C shows the total tax shift 
effects of the change from the current MAV system with M5 and M50 limitations to a land 
value tax. In INE, due to their productive use, multi-family parcels with at least four units 
experience 15.5% reduction of tax duties. While all other land uses have to pay more taxes, in 
part due to their low MAV/RMV ratio, the less productive the sites are, the more their tax 
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duties increase. As vacant lands, commercial-auto related sites and warehouse have highest 
LTV ratios, they witness the highest percentage changes. Similarly, while most parcels in OSE 
have negative tax shifts (partly due to their MAV/RMV ratio above to the county’s average 
value), multi-families with four units or more gain the most (a 36% decrease). Without 
improvement, vacant lands have to pay significantly more under LVT. 
 
Panel C: Current Property Tax - Two-Rate (90-10) LVT 





Total Tax Shift 
Total Percent 
Change 
INNER NORTHEAST           
Single Family 8,371 32,058,762 51,793,420 19,734,658 61.6% 
Multi-family 2-4 units 575 2,074,539 3,982,596 1,908,057 92.0% 
Multi-family 4+ units 87 3,413,178 2,882,852 -530,326 -15.5% 
Commercial 237 1,664,848 2,524,413 859,565 51.6% 
Office 31 512,896 689,357 176,461 34.4% 
Restaurant 34 130,789 225,250 94,462 72.2% 
Warehouse 32 179,981 434,465 254,484 141.4% 
Vacant 242 320,084 1,777,153 1,457,069 455.2% 
OUTER SOUTHEAST           
Single Family 13,351 45,093,484 39,163,694 -5,929,790 -13.1% 
Multi-family 2-4 units 485 2,379,326 1,755,955 -623,370 -26.2% 
Multi-family 4+ units 268 5,952,768 3,808,438 -2,144,330 -36.0% 
Commercial 229 3,834,965 3,414,869 -420,096 -11.0% 
Commercial - Auto 41 275,289 300,947 25,659 9.3% 
Office 28 286,222 237,657 -48,565 -17.0% 
Restaurant 57 394,791 573,001 178,210 45.1% 
Warehouse 35 757,817 487,146 -270,671 -35.7% 
Mobile Home 48 709,946 868,511 158,566 22.3% 
Vacant 517 493,592 1,225,105 731,513 148.2% 
Other 40 141,062 60,481 -80,582 -57.1% 
                        
The tax shift can also be seen from comparing changes in mill rates by land uses before and 
after switching to LVT. Implementing changes to property tax systems will create disparate 
impacts to mill rates depending on land use type. The relatively low MAV/RMV ratio of 
properties in the Inner-Northeast community all but guarantees an increase in levy under RMV 
tax, even with the 57.5% decrease in LCA rates. Under RMV tax, Outer-Southeast gets a 
decrease in tax rate on average for each land use class, with the largest decrease coming for 
Single Family Residential properties.  
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Table 4: Average Levy under Four Tax Regimes by Community 
  INNER NORTHEAST OUTER SOUTHEAST 











Single Family $3,830 $5,478 $6,187 $5,632 $3,378 $2,471 $2,933 $2,571 
Multi-Family $8,290 $13,659 $10,371 $12,946 $11,065 $9,577 $7,390 $9,103 
Mobile Home         $14,791 $12,885 $18,094 $14,014 
Commercial $6,697 $13,310 $10,923 $12,793 $15,223 $13,797 $13,762 $13,790 
Office $16,545 $29,482 $22,237 $27,911 $10,222 $8,727 $8,488 $8,675 
Restaurant $3,847 $7,064 $6,625 $6,969 $6,926 $7,706 $10,053 $8,215 
Industrial $26,486 $15,760 $3,795 $13,166 $27,458 $32,660 $8,814 $27,490 
Vacant $1,323 $3,409 $7,344 $4,262 $955 $1,100 $2,370 $1,375 
Total $4,203 $6,303 $6,695 $6,388 $3,964 $3,060 $3,420 $3,138 
 
For all broad land use classes but one, average levy rates increase with higher rates of LVT (see 
Figure 5). Multi-Family properties are the one land use class for which effective tax rates are 
reduced. This suggests that any increased rate for land value relative to improvement value, 
beyond incentives created, will benefit—and incentivize the development of—Multi-Family 
properties. 
Figure 5: Effective Mill Rates under Three Tax Scenarios, by Property Type and Community 
 
Whether each property pays more or less under each tax shift is determined by a combination 
of two factors: the MAV/RMV and Land to Total Value (LTV) ratios. This is represented in the 
MAV/RMV tax shift columns of Table 5 below. The majority of properties in INE pay more with a 
switch to RMV, emblematic of their consistent high value growth relative to other areas. Only 
                                                          







SFR MFR COM VAC SFR MFR COM VAC
Inner Northeast Outer Southeast
Current Effective Mill Rate RMV Mill Rate LVT Effective Mill Rate (90/10)
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9% of OSE properties pay more with an RMV tax, with the remainder paying less (consistent 
with their higher than average LTV ratios).  
 
The share of properties paying more from a switch from RMV to LVT systems is entirely 
determined by the size of the property’s LTV ratio relative to the county average of 39.5%. For 
example, 83% and 86% of single family properties in INE and OSE, respectively, have a higher 
LTV ratio than the county average, rendering an increase in tax. The final column for each 
community is the combined effect of each factor. Again, most properties in the INE community 
pay more. In the OSE, despite majorities of vacant lots, and commercial buildings paying more, 
only 26% of properties would pay more than they are currently paying under an LVT. 
 
Table 5: Shares facing Positive Tax Shift by Land Use 


















Single Family 8,371 85% 83% 88% 13,351 6% 86% 23% 
Multi-Family 662 98% 65% 94% 753 12% 57% 14% 
Mobile Home      48 31% 92% 63% 
Commercial 281 97% 40% 88% 270 54% 67% 59% 
Office 31 94% 55% 74% 28 25% 64% 36% 
Restaurant 34 91% 47% 85% 57 58% 79% 82% 
Vacant 242 74% 100% 100% 517 47% 100% 99% 
Totals 9,623 86% 81% 89% 15,030 9% 84% 26% 
 
Figure 6 below displays the effective mill rates resulting from the 90/10 LVT. The separate rates 
on land and improvement value results in a significantly more balanced rate distribution than in 
Figure 4 above. Furthermore, a LVT system would be slightly income progressive (as opposed to 
the marked regressivity shown in Figure 4). OSE is in red, while INE is in blue. 























Median Household Income by Census Tract
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One of the most important theoretical advantages of LVT is its potential effect on incentivizing 
land owners to make the best use of their land, while at the same time discouraging land 
speculation. In the current tax system, redevelopment increases the MAV—bringing it much 
closer to the RMV, and significantly increasing the taxes levied. This section considers how 
differently the two-rate LVT may affect parcels with different levels of land utilization. Our 
analysis also examines the mechanism through which LVT may provide incentives for owners of 
underutilized sites to put their land to more productive use. 
The model simulation method classifies parcels by land utilization status: fully developed or 
underutilized. Two criteria are combined to make this distinction: i) observed utilization of 
zoned development capacity; and ii) the LTV ratio. A parcel is treated as underutilized if its LTV 
ratio > 0.66 (i.e. its land value is more than double the improvement value). The assumption is 
that an underutilized site is economically unproductive and would become more productive if 
redeveloped.  To meet the physical utilization threshold, a parcel’s building bulk (density) must 
reach at least 20% of its maximum development capacity as specified by its zoning designation. 
Both threshold criteria (< 0.66 and > .20) must be met for a parcel to be classified fully 
developed. 
Concerning the physical utilization criterion, a parcel’s zoning designation is used to determine 
its maximum development limit. For single-family residential parcels (R2.5, R5, R7, R10, R20 and 
RF zones), the maximum number of allowed units is determined by dividing the total parcel 
area by the maximum density. For multi-family residential parcels (R1, R2, R3 and IR zones), the 
maximum number of residential units is calculated by dividing the total parcel area by the 
maximum density. In both cases, the rounding rules specified in the City of Portland’s Land 
Division Information Guide are adopted. For commercial zones, the total parcel area is 
multiplied by zone-based maximum floor area ratio (FAR) to obtain the allowed building square 
footage. The data base contains existing square footage of building area for all developed 
parcels. 
The level of observed utilization of zoned development capacity is expressed as the percentage 
of development capacity currently used in terms either of lots, residential units or areas. For 
example, each parcel in the single-family residential zones is counted as one lot. Then its level 
of physical utilization is obtained by one divided by its maximum number of allowed lots. As the 
number of existing residential units in multi-family areas are not available, it is estimated by 
dividing total building areas by the maximum density without rounding22. The only exception is 
the industrial zones where no FAR or other similar limits on maximum development capacity is 
available to calculate the first indicator. Thus all vacant industrial properties are assigned to the 
“less than 20%” group while other industrial lands are mapped into the “at least 20%” group. 
                                                          
22 Apart from exempt properties, a few parcels were dropped from the sample due to their lacks of necessary data. 
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Figure 7 below compares changes in mill rates23 between underutilized and fully developed 
parcels under current property tax and two tax simulations while holding county-level tax 
revenue unchanged. As expected, sites utilized more intensively experience comparatively lower 
mill rates under LVT. 
 
With the change from the current tax system using MAV assessments to RMV equal rate 
taxation, overall tax burden increases in Inner Northeast, but decreases in Inner Southeast 
regardless of land use efficiency, due to the differences in the MAV / RMV ratio. However, 
when adopting LVT, the divergence in tax burden between the two utilization groups becomes 
unambiguous. Underutilized parcels witness significant increases in both communities, while 
the fully developed parcels will pay minimal additional taxes. Note here that lots classified as 
“fully developed” meet both criteria but are not necessarily developed to full allowable 
capacity. 
Figure 7: Effective Mill Rates: Underdeveloped and Developed Land Parcels
 
Note also that developed sites are likely to have improvement value accounting for a larger share 
of total property value than underutilized parcels (Table 6), and improvements are taxed at 
substantially lower rates than land. Fully developed lands still pay a marginally higher tax after 
exempting Measures 5 and 50 limitations and switching to 90/10 LVT. The reason is they still have 
higher land value’s share of total value than the average of the county (which is 39.5%) (see the 
table below). 
Table 6: Land and Improvement Market Value as Shares of Total Real Market Value 
Area Land Utilization Status # Parcels 




Fully Developed 8,733  41.1% 58.9% 
Underutilized 523  88.5% 11.5% 
OUTER 
SOUTHEAST 
Fully Developed 11,341  41.9% 58.2% 
Underutilized 1,342  80.4% 18.6% 
                                                          







Fully developed Underutilized Fully developed Underutilized
INNER NORTHEAST OUTER SOUTHEAST
Current Property Tax RMV Equal Rate Tax 90-10 LVT
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Compared to the current property tax, underutilized lands pay significantly higher taxes, while 
developed lots experience either tax reductions as in Outer Southeast, or substantially smaller 
increases as in Inner Northeast. 
 
These incentive-based tax shifts are intended to encourage the owners of underutilized sites, 
particularly vacant lots, to invest in improving their properties. Some owners will pay higher tax 
bills due to the change to higher real market values. Nevertheless, such increases are marginal; 
even relatively low returns on their capital investments suffice to cover them.  For example, 
suppose that underutilized sites are redeveloped in such a way that increases the market value 
of their improvements by 200% while land market values are unchanged.  
Table 7 below illustrates changes in their total property value and their tax bills. With this 
assumed improvement, on the one hand, the total value of underutilized parcels increases by 
over 20% and 35% in INE and OSE respectively. However, these substantial value increases are 
associated with modestly higher tax bills (3% and 5% respectively)24. If the minimum required 
return on investment (ROI) is defined as the ratio between the amount of tax increased and the 
change in the improvement values of these underutilized lands, then under our assumptions 
the minimum ROI is only 0.26% and 0.22% in INE and OSE, respectively. 
Table 7: Tax Shift with 50% Increase in Improvement Value of All Underutilized Parcels 
  % Growth in 
Improvement Value 
% Increase in Total 
Real Market Value 
% Increase in Total 
LVT 
Required Return to 
Investment 
Inner Northeast 200% 23.06% 2.85% 0.26% 
Outer Southeast 200% 37.63% 5.01% 0.22% 
Commercial Corridor Analysis 
In addition to looking at how LVT incentivizes development for INE and OSE in general, it can be 
helpful to focus on commercial corridors in particular. Portland city land use policies encourage 
more pedestrian-friendly commercial settings – akin to the ‘main street’ configuration, as 
opposed to the sprawling pattern of commercial strips.25 The question is whether LVT 
incentivizes more compact commercial development. Figure 8 shows the four commercial 
corridors analyzed in Inner-Northeast Portland: North Mississippi Ave., North Williams Ave., NE 
Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., and NE Alberta Street.  Only commercial uses within the corridors 
are included in the data for analysis. 
                                                          
24 The actual investment would be more than the 100% improvement value when accounting for permits etc. 
25 City of Portland. “2035 Comprehensive Plan”. Page GP3-10. (December 2018). Retrieved from: 
www.portlandoregon.gov/bps 
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Figure 8: Map of Commercial Corridors in Inner-Northeast Portland 
 
A commercial property is defined as underutilized or fully developed following the 
methodology described above. An additional challenge to the modeling of redevelopment 
scenarios is determining the amount each underutilized property increases in improvement 
value. For this analysis, NERC assumes that each underutilized tax lot will redevelop to a level 
where the land value is reduced to 25% of the total value (.25 LTV ratio). This ratio is consistent 
with other newly developed lands in the INE.  
The four figures below (9, 10, 11, and 12) reveal the average amount of taxes paid by fully 
developed, underutilized, and redeveloped commercial parcels under the three different tax 
rates in each of the four commercial corridors. Notably, under the current system there is a 
strong disincentive to redevelop land, as new improvements significantly increase the amount 
of taxes owed annually. Moving from the current tax system to an LVT would incentivize 
redevelopment in each of these commercial corridors.  
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Figure 12: Northeast Alberta Commercial Corridor Redevelopment Scenario, Mean Taxes 
 
What first becomes obvious is the tax burden difference between underutilized and fully 
developed properties under the conventional equal rate tax system utilizing both MAV and 
RMV assessments.  Underutilizing, or in some cases neglecting, structural improvements on 
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Changing to the 90/10 LVT tax regime, a much smaller increase in tax burden is experienced 
under the redevelopment scenario. In the N. Mississippi corridor, redeveloped properties in the 
aggregate actually see a lower tax burden compared to the current MAV levy on fully 
developed sites due to the relatively high value of property and level of utilization in that 
corridor (see Figure 10). 
Mitigation  
Under LVT, specific situations may create disproportionate and unintended hardship for 
landowners. These situations can create hesitancy toward a switch to any form of LVT, and thus 
some form of mitigation or exemption is needed. For some land uses, such as farms, the most 
efficient land use may not provide society the greatest benefit and should be excluded from 
LVT policies. In other situations, long standing homeowners who may have seen a massive 
increase in their property value over a long period of time, but who have not seen an 
equivalent increase in their income could see an untenable increase to their property tax 
payment. Here, we discuss a few oft-cited hardship cases and potential mitigation methods. 
 
The highest and best use may not always be deemed the best use of land. Farms provide value 
without full development. With a switch to LVT farms could see a large increase to their 
property tax payments. As it is not the intention of LVT to incentivize the building of high-
density housing on farmland, farms could be excluded from a shift to LVT and remain under an 
RMV tax structure exempt from M5 & M50, or given a current use  exemption that allows them 
to continue to operate without undue tax burden. It should be emphasized that there are not 
many farms with the Portland Urban Growth Boundary and farm land is often assessed at a 
significantly lower land value—meaning that there likely will be little need for exemptions.26    
 
Another situation requiring separate policies under a switch to LVT (or RMV) is households that 
are asset rich but cash poor. This commonly occurs in urban areas that have seen high 
appreciation in properties’ values over the last 15 to 30 years. A homeowner may have 
purchased a home when property values were lower, leaving them with a valuable asset. 
However, the same homeowner’s wages may not have appreciated at the same rate as their 
property, leaving them with most of their assets tied up in their home. Under a switch to LVT, 
this type of homeowner would see an increase to their property tax payment, but may be 
unable to afford the increase, especially if it is substantial. In these scenarios, mitigation 
techniques are often used to offset the burden for the impacted homeowners. 
 
A variety of mitigation techniques have been proposed to smooth the transition to LVT for 
those who are asset rich and low-income, and Oregon currently has other tax deferrals that 
could be extended to help such households. One option is to grandfather households who are 
                                                          
26 Fiscal Policy Center, University of Washington. (1999). Resource Lands in Clark and Grant Counties. 
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asset rich and low-income into their previous property tax payments until death or the sale of 
the property (either allowing the tax payments to increase at some fixed growth rate or 
continuing under the current tax system).  
 
Another mitigation model for this scenario involves introducing LVT with a gradual increasing 
split rate over a period of time. Instead of a 90/10 land to improvement value ratio, the first 
year of implementation might begin with a 60/40 land-to-total value split. This then gradually 
increases over a number of years, easing the transition period for cost-burdened homeowners 
(see Figure 13 for how this transition may occur). 
 
Figure 13: LVT Graduated Split Rates 
 
Oregon currently uses other mitigation techniques to lower property taxes for those who 
experience undue burden from their tax situation. One, which could be expanded with a switch 
to LVT is the current tax deferral for disabled and senior citizens who own property.27 Under the 
current laws, disabled and senior property owners can apply for a property tax deferral if they 
meet certain qualifications. Similar deferrals could be granted to those who are asset rich but 
house poor under an LVT model.  
 
Another tax application model crafted as an alternative to LVT is the Assessment Exemption of 
Improvements (AXI) model developed by the Center for the Study of Economics28. 
The AXI Model 
Unlike the split-rate LVT system, the AXI method uses an equal rate for both land and 
improvement assessments.  In order to create a similar investment incentive as LVT, a fixed 
amount of improvement value is exempted from taxation from all properties. All else constant, 
                                                          
27 Oregon Department of Revenue: ORS 311.666-ORS 311.701.  Available at wwww.oregon.gov/DOR/deferral 
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this results in lower effective tax rates for properties with building value near the exemption 
level and removes the disincentive to build up to highest and best use value.  It becomes 
evident that by adopting the AXI model low value structures—usually owned by lower income 
occupants—will receive the largest benefit. 
Figure 14: Illustration of Tax Shift Rate Calculation Maintaining Constant Revenue 
 
For a brief assessment of how the AXI system might compare to LVT, we first find the share of 
property tax coming from land value, i.e. the land tax ratio, for different LVT ratios. We then 
calculate the AXI universal building value exemption required to achieve a comparable land tax 
ratio. As with the other models, levy rates are adjusted to maintain revenue neutrality. A 90/10 
LVT system results in 85.5% of property tax revenue coming from land value. To achieve the 
same land tax ratio, the first $30 million of building value would need to be exempt. A 60/40 
LVT results in a more feasible exemption figure, with an AXI exemption of $159,931 of 
improvement value or around 83.25% of the median building value in Multnomah County. To 
maintain revenue neutrality, LCA rates would need to increase around 29% to an effective rate 
of $12.62 per $1,000 of non-exempt property value. 
Table 8: Simulated AXI Exemption Levels 
LVT Ratio  
 Land Tax 
Ratio  
 BV Exempt. 
Ratio  
 Improvement 
Value Exemption  
 Total Improvement 
Value Exemption  
90/10 85.5% 15510%  $     29,976,177  $   81,947,747,610 
80/20 72.3% 2636%  $       5,094,597  $   69,264,546,007 
70/30 60.4% 299%  $          578,554  $   52,794,606,483 
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Figure 16 shows effective mill rates for the current tax system, a 60/40 LVT, and an AXI 
exemption of $159,931 across estimated median household income.29 Both alternative tax 
models are more progressive with respect to income than the current tax system. The pattern 
suggests that the 60/40 LVT and AXI would reduce rates on average for census tracts with 
median income below $60,000, with AXI resulting in the lowest effective rates. In the areas for 
which we have estimates of median household income, AXI results in lower effective rates for 
all income levels except the $70,000 income group. This suggests AXI is a potential mitigating 
measure for the tax shift to LVT, while providing comparable progressivity. 
Figure 15 below shows the shares of properties that would pay less or more under an AXI tax 
structure compared to the current MAV system and the proposed 90/10 LVT. The vast majority 
of residential and industrial properties would pay a lower levy under the AXI system relative to 
the current system, while commercial and vacant properties would pay more. Much of this is 
due to the rate changes of the shift to an RMV system. However, compared directly to the 
90/10 LVT, majorities of residential, commercial, and vacant properties would pay less under an 
AXI system, while the majority of industrial properties would pay more. 
Figure 15: Count of Tax Shifts from AXI by Land Use Class 
 
                                                          
29 The $20,000 income block includes those from $20,000 to $29,999, with similar groupings for later blocks. 
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Figure 16: Effective Mill Rates for Mitigating Policies by Median Household Income Groups 
 
One potential downside of AXI relative to LVT is its limited impact on incentives. While LVT 
incentivizes development for all properties by reducing improvement value tax rates, the 
incentives created by the AXI model are limited to properties with improvement value below 
the exemption. Properties with low improvement values, such as vacant lots, will face no 
increase in property tax for developing up to the exemption, but all properties with 
improvement values at or above the exemption rate face higher tax rates for any development. 
This implies that the mitigation effects of AXI would largely apply to single family dwellings 
rather than multifamily or commercial properties. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, land-based property tax systems, whether a split-rate LVT or an AXI building 
exemption tax, do what they are designed to do—place more of the tax burden on wealthier 
land-owners, and encourage the highest and best use of land. Based on the simulations 
performed on the INE and OSE communities, a LVT would provide a more equitable tax 
structure, incentivize structure upgrading and development of underutilized properties, and 
discourage “holding” land for speculative purposes. Furthermore, the potential downsides of 
the tax policy—such as increasing taxes on low-income homeowners—can be mitigated with 
carefully crafted legislation. In short, many of the inequities created by Measure 5 and 50 
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